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Kant and English Nature Poetry 
Donald G. Marshall 
UNDERLYING THIS PAPER is a methodological issue. I am a student 
of British poetry, in particular British poetry from Milton in about 1650 to 
Wordsworth up to about 1830. My study aims to achieve the general intel 
ligibility that arises from connecting particular poems into a historical nar 
rative set within a broad cultural context. To create this simultaneously 
connective and interpretive narrative, I need a language with some special 
capacities. It has to bring out issues that are perceptibly important to the 
particular poems I have chosen to write about. It must be applicable with 
enough consistency over a historical range of poems to establish a continu 
ity against which changes take on significance. And it must let a reader 
glimpse a background that gives depth and scope to whatever is at stake in 
particular poems. 
The methodological question is whether I may legitimately draw any or 
all ofthat language from Kant. Here are some arguments against doing so. 
1. While Kant wrote in this historical period, he did not know the 
English poetic tradition, and hence, he cannot be responding to its specific 
concerns. Moreover, the poet I am interested in, Wordsworth, did not 
read Kant and cannot have been supported by Kant in whatever thinking 
goes on in his poetry. Using Kant as part of a historical argument will force 
me to postulate a "Zeitgeist" that will remain obscure and amorphous and 
will fail to meet the criteria of precision, concreteness, and clear instantia 
tion that govern historical writing. 
2. Apart from the historical issue, Kant is a philosopher. Philosophy 
weighs the truth of ideas by formulating them precisely and examining 
arguments for and against them. Even when poetry is explicitly a "poetry 
of ideas," it works by bringing out the potential of ideas to serve as the sub 
stance 
shaped into forms a reader can perceive with satisfaction. If Lucre 
tius's De rerum natura is a brilliant poem ?and it is ?that counts neither for 
nor 
against Epicurean philosophy. If I use Kant's concepts to describe even 
philosophical poems, I will cancel what is specifically poetical about them. 
At the same time, I will illegitimately force the poems to answer questions 
they did not ask. 
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3. Moreover, philosophical ideas are legitimate only when they are 
true. Some would claim that Kant's is an exploded system ?a monument 
in the history of philosophy, no doubt, but quaint in its scholastic air of 
conceptual rigor and laughable when it takes seriously outmoded views of 
the world and human being. Historical interpretation must speak a lan 
guage that, if not undeniably true, must at least seem not obviously false. 
It will surprise no one to learn that I am in no position to resolve these 
doubts. Even so, it seems promising to note the surprising affinities 
between Kant and some poetry of the period I've mentioned, in this case, 
Wordsworth's. And so, I am going to plunge ahead with Kant, despite all 
the scruples I can invent against doing so. 
In 1726, a Scots poet by the name of James Thomson, who had moved to 
London, published a poem called Winter. It was so successful that he was 
encouraged to revise it and work his poetic way through the rest of the 
year. In 1730, the first collected edition of The Seasons appeared, and it was 
revised and reprinted many times down to the author's death in 1746. 
Thereafter, it remained one of the most widely known and admired.poems 
in the language well into the nineteenth century, after which time it rap 
idly fell from favor and is now read by a few specialists only. In 1798, Wil 
liam Wordsworth and Samuel Coleridge published anonymously a volume 
titled Lyrical Ballads, With a Few Other Poems. The last poem in that collec 
tion was by Wordsworth and had the almost parodically long title "Lines 
composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey, on revisiting the banks of the 
Wye during a tour. July 13, 1798." Under its more familiar name, "Tin 
tern Abbey," it remains highly esteemed, the one poem which more than 
any other is the exemplary instance of "English romanticism." 
Here are some lines from Thomson's 
"Spring": 
Hail, Source of Being! Universal Soul 
Of heaven and earth! Essential Presence, hail! 
To thee I bend the knee; to thee my thoughts 
Continual climb, who with a master-hand 
Hast the great whole into perfection touched. 
By thee the various vegetative tribes, 
Wrapt in a filmy net and clad with leaves, 
Draw the live ether and imbibe the dew. 
By thee disposed into congenial soils, 
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Stands each attractive plant, and sucks, and swells 
The juicy tide, a twining mass of tubes. 
At thy command the vernal sun awakes 
The torpid sap, detruded to the root 
By wintry winds, that now in fluent dance 
And lively fermentation mounting spreads 
All this innumerous-coloured scene of things. 
(556-571) 
This is not Thomson's poetry at its best, by any means. But leaving that 
issue aside, here are some lines from "Tintern Abbey." Wordsworth has 
been tracing the stages of his mental and moral development and weighing 
what he has lost, what he has gained, and what has continued undiminished: 
And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man: 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. 
(93-102) 
Both these poets speak of a "presence," but its manifestation is evidently 
very different. Thomson's presence is "essential," grasped intellectually in 
each specific natural being through an analysis of its functional coherence, 
an 
analysis conducted in emphatically scientific diction. That presence is 
figured as an artist or artisan, whose attributes are inferred from the order 
we find in the Book of Nature. Wordsworth's presence is grasped through 
feeling and sensing. Its lack of specification is compensated by its omnipres 
ence, reinforced by cumulative rhythms that delight in enjambment as they 
also roll over the boundaries between thinking, feeling, and sensing, 
between the mind and its objects, between the animate and the inanimate, 
and give a specious feeling of concreteness to the climactic phrase "rolls 
through all things." 
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A historical discourse in which both these poems figure will evidently 
need the narrative device of peripety or significant change. Change in 
what? Change in the content given to the "presence" manifest in nature. 
Thomson plainly thinks the evidence of order in nature points to an 
intelligent artificer. Natural objects exhibit design; design argues purpose; 
from purpose we infer an agent. Q.E.D. This line of thought ?the 
famous 
"argument from design"?pervades English religious apologetics 
in the early eighteenth century. It has been argued that the intellectual and 
physical battles over religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries left 
the English wary of dogmatic systems and of claims to biblical, that is, 
revealed authority. The scientific study of nature, in contrast, was demo 
cratically available to anyone with senses and the power to reason. The 
strategy was to grow specifically religious ideas and feelings on this admit 
tedly thin new soil. The argument from design projected a sketchy "pres 
ence," and the language used to describe nature created an intellectually 
and emotionally complex, but richly specific response to that presence. 
Philosophically, the argument from design was demolished by Hume in 
the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (completed about 1751, but pru 
dently withheld from publication until 1779, three years after his death). 
The associated response was destroyed by a reassertion of biblical authority 
and an insistence on a personal relation to God and His Son. One can specu 
late that those who thought in terms of this debate could not avoid feeling 
a gap between a scientific conception of the sensory world and the moral 
and spiritual effect they demanded of religion. 
Kant's central aim in the Critique of Judgment is exactly to adjust the rela 
tion of these two realms or perhaps sides of human experience. Kant evi 
dently believes that that adjustment requires a second, namely, in the rela 
tion between two modes of our experiencing the world?the mode in 
which we perceive art and the mode in which we perceive nature. In Kan? 
Life and Thought (which I follow closely here), Ernst Cassirer stresses that 
what drives Kant's inquiry is philosophical. He is not responding directly 
to the problem of teleology as he found it formulated in his cultural milieu, 
but is following out his own reflections on the concept of the a priori. In his 
Critique of Pure Reason, he analyzed the faculty of knowledge, which takes 
its coherence from conceptual laws; in his Critique of Practical Reason, he 
analyzed the faculty of desire, which takes its coherence from moral pur 
poses. Now he discovers a third and co-equal capacity of mind, the feeling 
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of pleasure and displeasure. Just as he found an a priori concept underlying 
each of the other two faculties, he finds here an a priori concept that origi 
nates 
solely in what he calls "reflective judgments." 
When we know something, we grasp its unity according to universal 
laws given by the understanding, laws which are prescribed to nature as a 
condition perceptual objects must meet in order to be intelligible to us at 
all. By contrast, reflective judgment is subjective. It grasps an object's 
unity by invoking a law judgment gives unto itself, namely, to think of an 
object as if it were brought about by design. In Kant's language, if the con 
cept of an object also functions as the ground for the object's coming into 
being, then that concept is called the object's "purpose" (20). Where a 
thing seems to cooperate in making the concept of purpose applicable in 
judging it, Kant says its form is "purposive." Beautiful nature and works 
of fine art are instances of this active co-operation, because in the act of per 
ceiving them, our own mental powers are brought into so harmonious a 
coherence that we cannot help thinking that such works were brought 
into being precisely to occasion that harmony. 
As Cassirer argues, the strength of Kant's analysis is its power to illu 
minate various experiences we possess. One of these experiences is our per 
ception of art. Art brings into existence objects whose presentation to our 
mind exhibits some unity of design. We grasp this unity not through our 
faculty of knowledge, but through our capacity of feeling, that is through 
our 
ability to experience pleasure and displeasure. The pleasure involved in 
art is detached from whatever specific utility the object may have for us and 
registers simply as the internal harmony that perceiving the artwork 
creates in us. For Kant the feeling of pleasure and displeasure provides us 
with a direct apprehension of our individual, mental life. Artworks give us 
no scientific knowledge of things and provide neither moral instruction 
nor the means of meeting moral demands. But when we perceive a work of 
art, in our response to it and there alone we feel our life as such. 
In eighteenth-century philosophy and poetry, the response to nature 
regularly leads to the assertion that a designing intelligence lies behind the 
scene. Kant's dismissal of such thinking, however, leads to a deepened 
understanding of teleology. No longer does the perception of design lead 
to an argument for a separate artificer. Much less is that artificer confined to 
human ways of making ?as in the unexamined anthropomorphism that was 
the secret ground of the argument for design. But neither is the concept of 
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purpose a mere subjective imposition. What the power of reflective judg 
ment manifests is a legitimate capacity to intuit a whole in an experience 
that, Cassirer says, despite its wholeness does not go beyond our finite, 
discursive nature. This capacity, Cassirer goes on, yields a new conception 
both of the self and of nature. When we think of an artwork or a beautiful 
object of nature, we cannot treat these things as something we know 
objectively and conceptually. We cannot use it to preempt the labor of 
finding out the specific laws of nature, nor does it enable us to spell out 
rules an artwork must obey to be beautiful. We feel it, and we cannot help 
but feel it, yet we do not explain it. We thus bump up against the boun 
daries of our human capacities. Through critical reflection we locate those 
boundaries; we find what we are. 
In his reflections on life seen as a whole, Kant adumbrates something 
further. Like the temporal arts, like music or narrative, the course of indi 
vidual life and the course of life in its totality forms a whole we feel but can 
not 
specify conceptually. It has a coherence that does not belong to laws of 
nature nor to a free human will fixed on a moral purpose. Feeling this sort 
of wholeness enhances our mind's power to encompass the most variegated 
experiences while maintaining the freedom of our perceiving minds. 
I am aware that this glimpse of Kant, through the eyes of Cassirer, is 
abstract and obscure. Nevertheless, it was exactly these abstractions which 
Goethe and Schiller said expressed their deepest intuitions about the poetry 
they wished to write. Like Kant, Wordsworth is notorious for the abstrac 
tion and elusiveness of his diction. There is an uncanny fit between the 
experience Wordsworth is describing and the experience of thinking 
which Kant analyzes. It is the grasp of his own life which provides the poet 
with the resources he needs to experience the whole of the natural world as 
an infinity correlated with the unfolding whole of his own being. Thus, 
reading Wordsworth through Kant, we can see Wordsworth's poetry as 
grasping a "presence" in nature in a manner that neither misconceives it as 
objectively known fact nor shrinks it to mere subjective wish-fulfillment. 
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